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Abstract. The Vaudenay model for RFID privacy from Asiacrypt 2007 suffers
from the impossibility to address strong privacy. It has however been shown by
Ng et al. at ESORICS 2008 that the impossibility result leads to no practical
threat, so that the definition from 2007 may be unnecessarily strong. This paper
proposes a slight change in the definition of privacy from the Vaudenay model
(Asiacrypt 2007). Then, we show that by adding a plaintext-aware assumption
on the public-key cryptosystem, the proposed protocol always achieves strong
privacy with our new definitions.
1 Introduction
An RFID system consists of 3 components: a back-end database, a number of
readers and tags. Tags communicate with readers through a wireless link to
authenticate themselves. While tags can only maintain one session, readers can
communicate with several tags in parallel. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the RFID system has only one reader. So, during the authentication process,
the reader queries the back-end database through a secure link. Clearly, RFID
tags face two contradictory requirements: on the one hand, they must securely
identify to a reader; on the other hand, they must hide any traceable information
to observers or adversaries.
RFID tags are identified by a unique ID. Cheap tags may be corruptible: it
may be possible to open them and read the content of their non-volatile memory.
Additionally, they have no internal clock. Such a tag has limited memory and
computational power. It can perform symmetric-key based operations: pseudo-
random generation, hash computations [10], symmetric-key encryption [9,19]
and message authentication codes [33]. However, these limitations vary depend-
ing on the application and the allocated budget. Best scenarios allow the tag to
use elliptic-curve cryptography [21].
Privacy Models. Several efforts were put in transposing the notion of privacy for
RFID, which resulted in several models [3,28,2,25,30,34,15,16,17,11,27,13,31].
Arguably, the definition given by Vaudenay [34] is the most general one. It
considers concurrence, tampering (i.e., getting the internal state of an anony-
mous tag), and the return channel from the reader (i.e., whether a protocol ses-
sion on the reader side is accepting or not). Contrarily to several other models,
it allows adversaries to interact with many concurrent anonymous tags sampled
with arbitrary distributions. One difficulty is to identify non-trivial leakage. For
instance, let us assume an adversary interacting concurrently with four differ-
ent anonymous tags. The first three are known to be thrown in a set of three tags
numbered 1, 2, and 3, and the last anonymous tag is known to be thrown among a
pair of tags numbered 1 and 4. In this case, the adversary trivially infers that this
last anonymous tag must be the tag numbered 4. Following simulation-based
notions, an information is trivial if the same one could be obtained when the
protocol messages are simulated by an additional process called a blinder. The
blinder is separate from the adversary and the system. It has therefore neither
secrets. However, it knows all interactions.
In [34], Vaudenay shows that Strong privacy (i.e., privacy when adversaries
can corrupt any anonymous tags and read the return channel) cannot be achieved.
Intuitively, if an adversary creates a legitimate tag then corrupts it, he can then
simulate either this tag or an illegitimate one to a reader and the return channel
will tell them apart. However, no blinder should be able to do it (otherwise, we
would define another adversary from it). So, it may be considered as some non-
trivial information. This was quite puzzling since this adversary would by no
mean be any threat in practice. Indeed, this example heavily relies on the adver-
sary knowing the expected behavior of the environment and the impossibility to
simulate it without guessing what the adversary expects. For this reason, several
papers were dedicated to fixing the shortcomings of this model.
At first, Ng et al. [29] proposed at ESORICS 2008 the notion of a “wise
adversary”, modeling adversaries who cannot guess the behavior of the environ-
ment. This fix consists of not allowing adversaries to ask questions for which
they know the answer. Canard et al. [12] imposed a different restriction on the
adversary called “future-untraceability”. This requires, for every adversary, the
existence of a simulator for which the output of the adversary is unaffected.
At ESORICS 2011, Hermans et al. [22] proposed a simpler reformulation
of Vaudenay’s privacy definition that would allow Strong privacy from being
achievable by getting rid of the simulation-based approach.
Vaudenay’s privacy model was also extended to the case of mutual authen-
tication in a work by Paise and Vaudenay [32]. However, some results were
flawed, as discussed by Armknecht et al. [1]. Actually, they show that no RFID
protocol with mutual authentication can achieve strong privacy and security at
the same time for reasons which are essentially similar to the ones in [34].
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In this paper, we use knowledge extractors from plaintext-aware encryp-
tion schemes [4,5,6]. Loosely speaking, plaintext-aware encryption schemes are
public-key cryptosystems in which the only way for an adversary to produce a
valid ciphertext is to choose a plaintext and to encrypt it. So, by reading the
adversary’s mind, one could extract the corresponding plaintext.
Our contributions. We propose to update the Vaudenay model by changing the
definition of the blinder. In short, we allow the blinder to access the random
coins used by the adversary so that he could “read his mind” and predict the
behavior of the environment as well. This could fix the impossibility result from
[34] and [1]. Then, we show by using plaintext aware encryption techniques that
Strong privacy can be achieved in our model with the simple protocol (called
PKC protocol herein) of [34]. Our result provides strong confidence in the pri-
vacy protection deployed by the PKC protocol.
In Appendix, we further show that IND-CCA security is not enough for the
PKC protocol to reach strong privacy in the sense that the system may leak some
non-simulatable information. To show this, we construct a cryptosystem which
is IND-CCA secure but not plaintext-aware.
2 Preliminaries
A function f (k) is said to be polynomial if there exists a constant n 2 N such
that f (k) is O(kn). Similarly, f (k) = negl(k) if, for every n 2N, f (k) is O(k n).
For an algorithm A , A(y;r)! x represents the output after running A on
input y with coins r. The view of A , denoted viewA , is defined to include all the
inputs and random coins of A along with the list of the messages A received.
The ability of an algorithm to query an oracle O is denoted AO .
Given two algorithms A0 and A1 of same input/output domains, we define a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D and its advantage
AdvA0;A1D (k) =
Pr[DA0(1k)! 1] Pr[DA1(1k)! 1] ;
with the probability being taken over the random tape of all the algorithms.
A0 and A1 are said to be computationally indistinguishable, if for every distin-
guisher D, we have AdvA0;A1D (k) = negl(k).
Sampling Algorithms. An efficient sampling algorithm for a probability distri-
bution p is a polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm, in k, denoted Samp, that,
on input random coins r2 f0;1g`(k), with `() being a polynomial function, out-
puts vector elements from X such that jPrr[Samp(r) = x]  p(x)j= negl(k). We
say that a sampling algorithm Samp is inverse-samplable if it is invertible and
some conditions on the distributions are fulfilled.
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Definition 1 (Inverse-Sampling Algorithm [23]).We say that an efficient sam-
pling algorithm Samp is inverse-samplable if there exists a polynomial-time
inverter algorithm Samp 1 such that (r;Samp(r)) and (Samp 1(x);x)jx =
Samp(r) are indistinguishable
Public-Key Encryption Schemes. A public-key encryption scheme consists of
three polynomial-time probabilistic algorithms denoted KeyGen, Enc, and Dec
such that for all k 2 N, Pr[Decsk(Encpk(m)) = mjKeyGen(1k)! (sk; pk)] = 1.
The decryption algorithm may output ? if it could not decrypt a ciphertext c.
We use the standard notions of IND-CPA and IND-CCA security. In the security
game, the advantage of the adversary is denoted AdvIND-CPA resp. AdvIND-CCA.
3 A Model for RFID Security and Privacy
Throughout this section, we recall the definitions in the Vaudenay model and
our proposed updates. Most of what follows is taken from [34].
An RFID system is defined by a pair of two probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms and one two-party protocol to be executed between the reader and
a tag. A first algorithm SetupReader is used to initialize the reader. It creates
a pair of secret/public key (sk; pk) (typically, no public-key cryptography is
used and pk =?). The second algorithm is for the creation of the tags and is
SetupTagpk(ID)! (KID;SID), where ID refers to the identifier of the new tag.
When the tag is legitimate, the tag secret KID is stored along with ID in the
database; while the tag’s initial state SID is always put inside the tag. An ille-
gitimate tag has no entry in the database. Finally, a polynomial-time interactive
protocol between the reader and a tag ID in which the reader ends up with a tape
Output and the tag ends up with a tape OutputID completes the definition of an
RFID system. By convention, if the protocol fails from the reader’s perspective,
we set Output =?. When the protocol does not feature reader authentication,
OutputID is void.
Simple RFID Protocols. We focus on a relevant class of RFID schemes called
simple. These are 2-path protocols in which the reader sends a challenge and
receives an answer. Then, it looks for a (ID;KID) database entry satisfying a
predicate Y. The found pair identifies the tag and may be updated.
Definition 2 (Simple RFID Scheme). An RFID scheme is said to be simple if
the following conditions are fulfilled:
– The reader sends a query to the database with its secret key sk and the
(possibly partial) transcript tp obtained from a protocol session.
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– There exists a predicate Y, i.e., a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
that outputs a single bit, that takes as input sk, tp, and a database entry
(ID;KID) such that the response from the database is computed by returning
a database entry, picked uniformly, that satisfies the predicate.
– Once a tag ID has been identified in the database, its corresponding secret
in the database, KID, may be updated to a new value. When it takes place,
this procedure is carried out by an algorithm Update taking as input sk, ID,
KID, and the full transcript of the protocol instance t. This algorithm outputs
a new KID and the database entry (ID;KID) is updated.
It is straightforward to check that simple RFID schemes following Def. 2 satisfy
the more general definition from [34].
Fig. 1 represents a simple RFID scheme from [34] which is based on a
public-key cryptosystem. In what follows we call it the PKC protocol. In this
Tag System
State: pk; ID;KID Secret key: sk
DB: f: : : ;(ID;KID); : : :g
a            Choose a 2R f0;1ga
c= Encpk(IDk KIDka) c          ! Search (ID;KID) 2DB :Decsk(c) = IDkKIDka
Output: ID or ?
Fig. 1. PKC Protocol: an RFID scheme based on a public-key cryptosystem.
scheme, the state of the tags is composed of their ID and a uniformly distributed
k-bit string KID. Upon reception of an a-bit string challenge a, a tag sends the
encryption of IDkKIDka under the public key pk to the reader. The latter decrypts
the received ciphertext using its secret key sk and checks that it is well formed,
that a is correctly recovered and that (ID;K) exists in the database.
Adversaries. Adversaries can request the creation of legitimate and illegitimate
RFID tags. Furthermore, adversaries have the ability to draw one or more anony-
mous RFID tags, according to a chosen probability distribution. All interactions
with the reader and the drawn tags is controlled by the adversary. Moreover, the
adversary has also the ability to tamper with any drawn tag and to retrieve its
internal state. After a while, the adversary has also the possibility to release the
tag so that it can be drawn again.
Definition 3 (Adversary [34]). An adversary is a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm. It takes a public key pk as input and has access to the following
interfaces:
5
– CREATETAGb(ID): create a tag with unique identifier ID. Depending on the
bit b submitted by the adversary, the tag may be legitimate, when b = 1, or
illegitimate, when b = 0. After calling upon SetupTagpk(ID)! (KID;SID)
for both type of tags, the pair (ID;KID) is inserted into the database if the
adversary queried for a legitimate tag.
– DRAWTAG(Samp)! ((vtag1;b1); : : : ;(vtagn;bn)): select a vector of tags
following a polynomial-time sampling algorithm Samp. During the period
in which a tag is drawn, the adversary has complete control over its inter-
actions. Along vtag, a bit b, set to 1 whenever the drawn tag is legitimate
and to 0 otherwise, is returned. When a tag is drawn, it is designated by a
unique virtual fresh identifier vtag. Drawing a tag that was already drawn
makes the oracle output ?.3 Additionally, this interface keeps a private ta-
ble T that keeps track of the real identifier of each drawn tag, i.e., it is such
that T (vtag) is the real identifier of the virtual tag vtag.
– FREE(vtag): release the RFID tag vtag. Once vtag is released, the adver-
sary can no longer communicate with it (except under another pseudonym
if it may be drawn again). Furthermore, its temporary memory is cleared to
prevent a protocol session to span under several vtag pseudonyms.4
– LAUNCH ! p: make the reader launch a new protocol instance p. The re-
turned p is a session identifier which can be assumed to be based on a
counter.
– SENDREADER(m;p)! m0: send a message m to a protocol instance p for
the reader.
– SENDTAG(m;vtag) ! m0: send a message m for the drawn tag vtag and
receive the answer m0.
– RESULT(p) ! x: return the result of the completed protocol instance p.
Namely, it yields 0 when Output=? and 1 otherwise.
– CORRUPT(vtag)! S: return the current state S of the tag T (vtag). It does
not return the content of the temporary memory of the tag.
We consider several classes of adversaries. Weak adversaries do not use the
CORRUPT interface. Forward adversaries can only use the CORRUPT interface
at the end. Namely, no other interface can be used after the CORRUPT one. All
other adversaries are Strong adversaries. We clearly have Weak  Forward 
Strong. Adversaries that do not have access to the side channel information on
the output of the protocol, i.e. to the RESULT oracle, are called NARROW. For
3 Definition 3 only differs from the original one in [34] in the introduction of the sampling
algorithm Samp in DRAWTAG queries. Vaudenay [34] uses the term of “distribution” for the
input of DRAWTAG although its representation may have exponential length.
4 The clearance of the temporary memory upon a FREE call was introduced in Paise-
Vaudenay [32]. It also meets the notion of “clean tag” by Deng et al. [17].
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any class P of adversaries, we define its Narrow counterpart for which we clearly
have Narrow-P P.
In the sequel, we restrict to adversaries who use distributions to the DRAW-
TAG such that, at any step, the table T can be successfully simulated by an
algorithm that is only given the view of the adversary as input. That is, we re-
quire adversaries to only submit sampling algorithms that are inverse-samplable
and allow them to compute a plausible guess for the identity of drawn tags in
polynomial-time. For this we introduce a new notion: simulatable adversaries.
Definition 4 (Simulatable adversary). Let A be an adversary interacting with
an RFID system. Let viewtA be the view of A at its t-th step and let T t denote the
table T of the DRAWTAG oracle at step t of A . We say that the adversary A is
simulatable if all her sampling algorithms submitted to DRAWTAG are inverse-
samplable and, for all t, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm A 0, such that
(viewtA ;T
t) and (viewtA ;A
0(viewtA)) are indistinguishable.
We note that when the adversary only draws one tag at the time (or in general,
a vector of logarithmic length), then our restrictions do not affect the original
definition as any sampling algorithm over such a set is inverse-samplable. So,
we believe that our restriction to simulatable adversaries is harmless.
Correctness. Basically, correctness formalizes the fact that whenever the reader
and a tag ID participate in an undisturbed protocol session, the reader authenti-
cates the tag, that is, it ends up withOutput= ID, except with a small negligible
probability. We include all malicious behaviors as it was done in [17].
Definition 5 (Correctness). A scheme is correct if for any Strong adversary
A , whenever there is a matching conversation between a tag of identity ID pro-
duced by DRAWTAG! (vtag;b) and a reader instance p, except with negligible
probability, p ends up with output ? if b= 0 and ID if b= 1.
Clearly, the PKC protocol is correct.
Security. Security formalizes the fact that no adversary should be able to make
the reader accept on a protocol session in which the adversary has been actively
involved. Roughly, an RFID scheme is said to be secure if no adversary is able
to make a reader protocol instance recognize an uncorrupted tag ID even if she
corrupts all the other tags, unless p and the tag have a matching conversation.
It has been shown in [34] that, for the case of a simple RFID scheme, the
notion of security reduces to an adversary playing the following game: create
(and draw) a single tag ID; use LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG; use an
oracle who checks the predicate Y(sk; ; ; ) on inputs different from ID; end on
a final SEND command to complete the instance for the reader and the tag. The
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adversary wins the simple security game if one protocol instance on the reader
identified tag ID but had no matching conversation. If the success probability of
any adversary in wining the security experiment is negligible, then the scheme
is simply secure. For simple schemes, simple security implies security.
It was shown in [34] that the PKC protocol is secure when the cryptosystem
is IND-CCA secure.
When the protocol includes reader authentication, a security notion for the
reader, in which the adversary’s goal is to make the tag accept the reader, also
needs to be defined. This was done in [32].
Privacy. An RFID scheme is private if no adversary can learn any information
about the identity of drawn tags which is non-trivial. The information is trivial
if the protocol messages could be simulated without interacting with the tags
or reader and without affecting the output of the adversary. The simulation is
performed by a process called a blinder.
Definition 6 (Blinder). A blinder B for an adversary A is a polynomial-time
algorithm which sees the same view as A (i.e, all the incoming messages and
used coins), records all the adversary’s Oracle queries and simulates all the
LAUNCH, SENDREADER, SENDTAG, RESULT oracles to A . A blinded adver-
sary AB is an adversary who does not produce any LAUNCH, SENDREADER,
SENDTAG, RESULT oracles query but have them simulated by B.
This definition changes from [34] by letting the blinder see the random tape of
the adversary. This is a crucial change as the impossibility result in the Vaudenay
model came from that adversaries could ask questions to the system for which
they knew the answer but such that it could not be simulated. Providing used
coins to the blinder allows it to “read the adversary’s mind” and simulate the
answer from the system.
Definition 7 (Privacy).We consider simulatable adversaries who start with an
attack phase consisting of only oracle queries and some computations then pur-
suing an analysis phase with no oracle query. In between phases, the adversary
receives the hidden table T of the DRAWTAG oracle then outputs true or false.
The adversary wins if the output is true. We say that the RFID scheme is P-
private if for such adversary A which belongs to class P there exists a blinder
B for which we have jPr[A wins] Pr[AB wins]j is negligible.
Again, we only introduced that adversaries must be simulatable in this defini-
tion. Clearly, all positive results from [34] hold with these new definitions since
privacy is defined by some property of form 8A 9B , our new adversaries are
compatible with the old definition, and old blinders are compatible with the new
definition. Namely:
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– Weak privacy can be achieved using pseudo-random functions;
– The PKC protocol with IND-CCA encryption is Forward private;
– The randomized OSK protocol is Narrow-Forward private in ROM.
However, the impossibility of strong privacy may not hold anymore since it
is a property of form 9A 8B . Actually, we will show that it no longer holds.
This is similarly the case for the impossibility result by Armknecht et al. [1] for
Narrow-Strong privacy and reader authentication, when mutual authentication
is considered.
4 Plaintext-Awareness
Plaintext-awareness states that if an adversary is able to produce a valid cipher-
text, then she should know the corresponding plaintext. Formalizing this notion
has proven to be a non-trivial task [4,5,6,8,18]. In the end, several notions of
plaintext-awareness were defined, such as, PA1, PA2, PA1+, and PA2+.
The difference between PA1 and PA2 lies in the attacker’s ability to get ci-
phertexts from external sources. In the settings of PA2, there is an oracle P (aux),
called plaintext creator and such that, on each query, it picks a message at ran-
dom (or possibly according to a distribution partially defined by its input aux).
The adversary can query Encpk(P (aux)). Any ciphertext obtained through this
oracle is added to a list CList, the list of ciphertexts for which the adversary
does not know the corresponding plaintexts. The essence of plaintext-awareness
is the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm A? (which construction may de-
pend on A), called plaintext extractor that successfully decrypts any ciphertext
given by the adversary that was not returned by Encpk(P (aux)). To carry out
the extraction, A? is given the view of A (which includes CList and the random
coins of A) and the target ciphertext c to be decrypted for c 62 CList.
To formalize information coming from external sources, Dent [18] extended
PA1 to PA1+ for adversaries who can get hold of uniformly distributed bits
from an external source. Later, Birkett and Dent [8] introduced the analog no-
tion of PA2+ for PA2 plaintext-awareness. These last two notions were proven
to be equivalent under the condition that the encryption scheme is IND-CPA [8].
PA1+ was also shown to imply PA2+ for simulatable encryption schemes [7].
We extend them to PA1++ and PA2++ when using any inverse-simulatable
source.
Definition 8 (PA encryption). Let O1 denote an oracle that returns a single
uniformly distributed bit. Let OS be an oracle who takes as input an inverse-
sampling algorithm and executes it using his own random tape. Given  2
fPA1;PA1+;PA1++;PA2;PA2+;PA2++g, we say that a public key cryptosys-
tem (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) is -plaintext-aware if 8A ; 9A?; 8P , all probabilistic
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polynomial-time, (pk;AO(Decsk(P ()))(pk)) and (pk;AO(A?(pk;;viewA ))(pk)) are
indistinguishable, where
OPA1(o) = (o) OPA2(o) = (Encpk(P ());o)
OPA1+(o) = (O1;o) OPA2+(o) = (Encpk(P ());O1;o)
OPA1++(o) = (OS;o) OPA2++(o) = (Encpk(P ());OS;o)
Note that PA1++ (resp. PA2++) plaintext-awareness trivially implies PA1+ (resp.
PA2+). Actually, we can even show equivalence.
Theorem 9. PA1+ and PA1++ (resp. PA2+ and PA2++) are equivalent.
Proof. We prove the theorem for the case of PA1++. It can be easily modified
so that it applies to PA2++. We thus assume PA1+ plaintext awareness. Let A
be a PA1++ ciphertext creator. We want to construct a plaintext extractor A?.
We construct a PA1+ ciphertext creator B as follows: B takes input pk and
simulates A , forwarding all its decryption queries to the decryption oracle. In
order to answer A’s queries to the randomness oracle, B runs the provided sam-
pling algorithm and query its randomness oracle, that we denote O1, every time
a new random bit is asked for. Clearly, B terminates in polynomial-time if all
samplings can be performed in polynomial-time. Remark that B does not use
any internal randomness besides the one used to initialize A .
Since B is a valid PA1+ ciphertext creator, we can assert the existence of
a plaintext extractor B? indistinguishable from a decryption oracle. We use B?
to construct a plaintext extractor A? for A . In the following, we assume that
A? maintains a state view0 initialized to viewA that will be used to simulate B’s
view. To answer A’s decryption queries, A? proceeds as follow:
1. If A queried the randomness oracle with an inverse-sampling algorithm
Samp and received x since the last invocation of A?, then A? computes
rS  Samp 1(x). After that, A? updates the simulated view of B to in-
clude the random bits rS, i.e., it sets view0  view0krS. Due to the prop-
erty of inverse-sampling algorithms, (rS;viewA) is indistinguishable from
(r;viewA), where r is the random string returned by OS for the sampling
request. Thus, by induction we show that viewB and view0 are indistinguish-
able. This procedure is repeated for every new sampling query.
2. A? then calls upon B?(pk;c;view0) and forwards its output to A .
Since viewA is included in view0 which is indistinguishable from viewB ,Pr[DAB?(pk;;view0);OS (pk)(1k)! 1] Pr[DAB?(pk;;viewB );OS (pk)(1k)!]= negl(k):
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Recalling that B?(pk; ;viewB) is indistinguishable from a decryption oracle to
A , we deduce that A? is a valid plaintext extractor. In other words,Pr[DAB?(pk;;view0);OS (pk)(1k)! 1] Pr[DADecsk();OS (pk)(1k)! 1]= negl(k):
This concludes the proof. ut
The following corollary results from the combination of Theorem 9 with
the equivalence result between PA2+ and PA2 [7], under the assumption that
the scheme is IND-CPA secure.
Corollary 10. If an encryption scheme is IND-CPA and PA2 plaintext-aware,
then it is PA1++ plaintext-aware.
5 Strong Privacy is Possible
In this section, we show that using the new definition of blinders, we can achieve
Strong privacy using plaintext-aware encryption schemes.
We consider the PKC protocol in Fig. 1. It has already been used by Vaude-
nay [34] to achieve Narrow-Strong privacy under the assumption that the under-
lying encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, our result requires PA1+ plaintext-
awareness from the encryption scheme. Naturally, since our definition of secu-
rity is unchanged from the original model, IND-CCA security for the encryption
scheme is sufficient to prove security [34].
Theorem 11 (PKC protocol achieves strong Privacy). Assume a cryptosys-
tem which is correct, PA1+ plaintext-aware, and IND-CCA secure. If 2 k and
2 a are negligible, then the PKC protocol is correct, secure, and Strong private.
In Section A, we have shown that IND-CCA security alone is insufficient to
prove this kind of result.
Note that in light of Corollary 10, we can implement the encryption scheme
by a simulatable, PA1+ plaintext-aware, and IND-CPA secure public-key en-
cryption scheme. Since the Cramer-Shoup [14] and Kurosawa-Desmedt [26] en-
cryption schemes satisfy all these notions [7,24] (under certain extractor-based
assumptions), any of these two schemes can be used.
Proof. First note that by Theorem 9, the encryption scheme is PA1++ plaintext-
aware. Correctness is trivially induced by the correctness of the encryption
scheme while security follows from IND-CCA security and [34, Theorem 19].
Therefore, we only need to prove privacy. To conduct the proof, we consider
a Strong adversary A and construct a blinder iteratively. That is, we construct a
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sequence of partial blinders B1; : : : ;B5 and let Ai =ABii 1 with A0 =A . The final
blinder for A is B = B1     B5. By showing that the outcome of Ai and Ai+1
are computationally indistinguishable, we deduce that B is indeed a full blinder
for A . So, the scheme is Strong private.
Game 0. Let Game 0 be the privacy game played by the adversary A0.
Game 1. We let Game 1 denote the privacy game performed by an adver-
sary who simulates every RESULT on a session p with a transcript (a;c), such
that c that has been obtained by a previous c0 = SENDTAG(vtag;a0) query. If
a 6= a0, for sure c does not decrypt to something containing a, so the answer to
RESULT(p) must be 0. The simulation is easy and perfect. In the other case,
that is, if a = a0, the decryption of c will be parsed to a matching challenge
a and some entry IDkKID which is in the database if and only if vtag is le-
gitimate. Fortunately, the blinder has access to this latter information as it is
returned in the response of the DRAWTAG oracle query drawing vtag. Again,
the simulation is easy and perfect. This fully defines B1 and we deduce that
Pr[A0 wins] = Pr[AB10 wins]. We can thus define the adversary A1 that never
queries RESULT on an instance p in which the response c was produced by a
previous SENDTAG query.
Game 2. In this game, we make all SENDTAG queries being simulated by a
partial blinder B2. To achieve this, we let r be number of SENDTAG queries and
make a sequence of hybrid blinders B02; : : : ;B
r
2 in which B
i
2 simulates the i first
SENDTAG queries. Note that B02 does not make any simulation so A
B02
1 is exactly
A1 and that Br2 is a partial blinder for all SENDTAG queries. We define the hybrid
Bi2 by simulating the i first encountered SENDTAG queries by encrypting random
strings of same length as IDkKIDka.
To prove that AB
i 1
2
1 and A
Bi2
1 have computationally indistinguishable distri-
butions, we construct an adversary C playing the IND-CCA game. Adversary
C receives the public key and runs AB
i 1
2
1 or A
Bi2
1 , depending on the bit of the
indistinguishability game, while simulating the RFID system, except the i-th
SENDTAG query. For that, C must simulate the environment for AB
i 1
2
1 =A
Bi2
1 .
Since all algorithms and oracles of the scheme, except for RESULT, do not re-
quire the secret key, C can easily perform the simulation by itself. Regarding
the RESULT interface, C just queries a decryption oracle and checks whether
the decrypted message matches.
The first i 1 SENDTAG queries are made to the IND-CCA challenger in a
real-or-random version. The challenge ciphertext c in the IND-CCA game is the
answer from the challenger. It is either a real answer (as in the AB
i 1
2
1 simulation)
or a simulated one (as in the AB
i
2
1 simulation). Note that no RESULT query is
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made on the session in which the adversary sent c (this case has been taken
care of in Game 1). So, C perfectly simulates either the game for AB
i 1
2
1 or the
game for AB
i
2
1 and is an IND-CCA adversary. Since C produces the output of
AB
i 1
2
1 =A
Bi2
1 , we obtain that
Pr[ABi21 wins] Pr[ABi+121 wins]  AdvIND-CCA(k);
and it results that
Pr[A1 wins] Pr[AB21 wins]  r AdvIND-CCA(k); which is
negligible as r is polynomially bounded and the scheme is IND-CCA secure.
At this point, we can legitimately consider an adversary A2 who makes no
SENDTAG queries.
Game 3. We now simulate all remaining RESULT queries. To do so, we con-
struct an adversary E playing the PA1++ game. The way B3 simulates RESULT
will come from the E construction.
E takes the public key then simulates A2 interacting with the RFID system.
Recall that, like in Game 2, the algorithms and oracles of the scheme do not
depend on the secret key, except for the RESULT queries that will be treated
hereafter. We let E simulate the RFID system to A2, handling her queries as
follow:
– Assuming w.l.o.g. that session identifiers are based on a counter, LAUNCH
is deterministically computed by E .
– Upon a CREATETAG(ID) query from A2, E inserts (ID; ) in a table DB1
if the query asks for a legitimate tag. Otherwise, it inserts (ID; ) in a table
DB0. This is deterministic.
– E simulates SENDREADER ! a queries by asking the oracle OS to sam-
ple from the uniform distribution over f0;1ga. It then forwards the received
answer a to A2. This is non-deterministic but only requires uniformly dis-
tributed independent bits.
– DRAWTAG(Samp) queries are handled by asking the randomness oracle OS
to sample from the distribution specified by Samp to get one or more ran-
dom ID. If any of the returned identifiers corresponds to a drawn tag, E
outputs ?. Otherwise, it generates, deterministically and for each returned
IDi, a fresh vtagi and inserts the pair (vtagi; IDi) in the table T . After that,
it sets the bit bi to 1 if IDi is legitimate, or to 0 otherwise. At last, it re-
turns (vtag1;b1; : : : ;vtagn;bn) to A2. This is non-deterministic but requires
inverse samplable distributions.
– CORRUPT(vtag) makes E reveal ID= T (vtag). Moreover, E looks for the
entry (ID;KID) in DB0 and DB1. If that corresponding entry contains a KID
different from 0 0, then it returns it. Otherwise, it queries OS to sample from
the uniform distribution over f0;1gk and assigns the answer to KID. It sub-
sequently updates the entry (ID; ) to (ID;KID) and returns this last pair as
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its answer. We further assume that whenever the tag ID is a legitimate one,
E inserts the entry (ID;KT (vtag)) in a table TE . This is non-deterministic
but only requires uniformly distributed independent bits. Note that non-
corrupted tags have no preset KID key.
– To simulate the RESULT(p) oracle for a reader instance p with transcript
(a;c), E sends c to the decryption oracle, checks that the recovered plain-
text is of the form IDkKIDka, that it matches a IDkKID 2DB1. (Note that this
implies that tag ID, has been corrupted, and has key KID.) If this is the case,
the answer to RESULT must be 1, otherwise, the simulated answer is 0. Note
that when the output of the E regarding a RESULT query is 1, the genuine
RESULT query would also have answered 1. So, this simulation is correct.
Errors in the simulation only occur when E predicts 0 and the genuine RE-
SULT query would also have outputted 1 in a session without matching con-
versation. Clearly, the failure of one of E’s simulations corresponds to the
happening of the event that there is a legitimate and uncorrupted tag which
was identified by a session p which received a c which was not produced by
any SENDTAG query. This implies that the event E that A2 wins the security
game holds. In other words,
Pr [A2 wins] PrAE2 wins Pr[E]. Since it
was shown that the PKC protocol is secure, this is negligible.
Since we assumed the encryption scheme to be PA1++ plaintext-aware, we can
use the plaintext extractor E? of E to replace the decryption oracle without sig-
nificantly altering the outcome distribution. However, E? requires the view of
E instead of the view of A2, so we cannot use it as an extractor for A2. Fortu-
nately, it is possible to reconstruct that view given the adversary’s random tape
and its queries. At first, we note that E’s random coins are only used to initialize
A2. Furthermore, all the randomness E obtains from OS to process CORRUPT
queries is revealed to A2. Moreover, since A2 is simulatable, we can use the
algorithm A 02, induced by Definition 4, to reconstruct, from A2’s view, a table
T 0 indistinguishable from T . Since this table lists all the mappings between
real and virtual identifiers, it is straightforward to reconstruct a randomness for
E that she received to process the DRAWTAG queries using the Samp 1 algo-
rithms corresponding to the sampling queries of A2. We let this whole operation
be carried by a polynomial-time algorithm V that takes as input the view of A2
and uses A 02 to reconstruct a view of E , i.e., it is such that V (viewA2) and viewE
are indistinguishable. It follows that E?(pk; ;V (viewA2)) and E?(pk; ;viewE )
are indistinguishable.
At this point, we are able to define B3, the partial blinder for RESULT
queries. Similarly to E , we assume that B3 maintains a table TB3 containing
a list of pairs (ID;KID) for corrupted legitimate tags. In order to simulate a RE-
SULT query on an instance p of transcript (a;c), the blinder proceed as follow.
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1. First, the blinder calls E?(pk;c;V (viewA2)) to get Decsk(c) = IDkKIDka0.
2. Then it verifies that a = a0 and outputs 0 in case of failure. Otherwise, it
continues.
3. At last, it outputs 1 if the pair IDkKID is listed in TB3 , and 0 otherwise.
The probability that Step 1 fails can be expressed as a distinguisher advantage
of the PA1++ game or between V (viewA2) and viewE , soPrhAB32 winsi PrhAE2 winsi AdvPA1++(k)+negl(k):
At the same time, Step 3 fails when the event E occurs, so using triangle in-
equalities we conclude thatPr [A2 wins] PrhAB32 winsi AdvPA1++(k)+Pr[E]+negl(k):
Recalling that E occurs with negligible probability and that the scheme is PA1++
plaintext-aware, the quantity above becomes negligible. Hence, B3 describes a
successful blinder for the RESULT oracle.
Game 4. In this game, we get rid of SENDREADER(p)! a queries. This can
easily be achieved by constructing a blinder B4 that returns uniformly distributed
values from the set f0;1ga. We further get rid of the SENDREADER(p;c) queries
in a trivial way as they return nothing and are not followed by any RESULT(p)
query. Clearly, simulation is perfect as both distributions are perfectly indistin-
guishable. Hence, Pr [A3 wins] = Pr[AB43 wins].
Game 5. Finally, we have an adversaryA4 who only produces LAUNCH queries.
We can trivially simulate the Them. It follows that Pr [A4 wins] = Pr[AB54 wins].
In the end, we have obtained an adversary A5 = AB, with B= B1     B5, who
does not produce any oracle query that is such that
Pr[A wins] Pr[AB wins]=
negl(k). The scheme is thus Strong private. ut
6 Conclusion
We updated the Vaudenay model for RFID privacy. Our model now makes it
possible to achieve strong privacy. Actually, we proved that the regular PKC
protocol with an IND-CCA and PA1+ secure cryptosystem achieves it. We have
further shown that IND-CCA security alone could fail to reach this level of
privacy. This shows a separation between our privacy model and the one from
[22]. However, the question whether this separation is significant remains open.
Acknowledgement. The authors would like to than Sherman Chow for his valu-
able help in the final version of this paper.
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A IND-CCA Security is not Sufficient for Strong Privacy
We define (KeyGen1, Enc1, Dec1), a variant of the Goldwasser-Micali cryp-
tosystem [20] as follows.
– KeyGen1(1k). Pick an RSA modulus N = pq, i.e, s.t. p and q are primes,
and y;z2Z?N such that
  y
N

=+1,

y
p

= 1, and   zN =+1. The scheme’s
key pair is pk1 = (N;y;z) and sk1 = p.
– Enc1pk1(b) = y
br2 mod N where b 2 f0;1g and r 2R Z?N .
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– Dec1sk1(c) = b such that ( 1)b =

c
p

.
Note that z in the public key is unused. Further note that z Enc1pk1(b) mod N is
a valid encryption of either b or b¯= 1 b depending on

z
p

which is unknown
for someone holding the public key. Let (KeyGen0, Enc0, Dec0) denote an IND-
CCA secure encryption scheme, we define (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) as follows.
– KeyGen. Run (sk0; pk0)  KeyGen0(1k) and (sk1; pk1)  KeyGen1(1k).
The scheme’s key pair is pk = (pk0; pk1) and sk = (sk0;sk1).
– Encrypt. To encrypt, set Encpk(x) = Enc0pk0

Enc1pk1(x1); : : : ;Enc
1
pk1(xn)

where x1; : : : ;xn is the binary decomposition of x.
– Decrypt. To decrypt, compute Decsk(c) = Dec1sk1(t1); : : : ;Dec
1
sk1(tn) where
t1; : : : ; tn = Dec0sk0(c).
We can easily see that (KeyGen, Enc,Dec) is IND-CCA secure. It is not plaintext-
aware since Enc0pk0

z Enc1pk1(x0) mod N; : : : ;z Enc1pk1(xn 1) mod N

is a valid
encryption of either x0; : : : ;xn 1 or x0; : : : ;xn 1 depending on

z
p

. To figure out
whether this encrypts x or x¯ would require to solve the quadratic residuosity
problem, which is supposedly a hard problem.
Consider the PKC protocol of Fig. 1 using the above IND-CCA secure
public-key encryption scheme.
Finally, the following Strong adversary defeats privacy.
1: CREATETAG(ID)
2: v DRAWTAG(ID)
3: SID  CORRUPT(v)
4: p LAUNCH
5: a SENDREADER( /0;p)
6: Set x= SIDka= x1; : : : ;xn
7: s= z Enc1pk1(x1); : : : ;z Enc1pk1(xn)
8: c Enc0pk(s)
9: SENDREADER(c;p)
10: b RESULT(p)
11: Output b
Clearly, an adversary outputs 1 if and only if

z
p

=+1. Therefore, a blinder
that follows the same distribution would break the quadratic residuosity prob-
lem, i.e., the problem of distinguishing quadratic residues from non-quadratic
residues. So, the PKC protocol based on this cryptosystem is strong-private in
the model from [22] but is not in our model, assuming that quadratic residuosity
is a hard problem. This proves the separation between privacy from [22] and our
strong privacy. Indeed, we have shown that the PKC protocol based on an IND-
CCA cryptosystem may still leak some non-simulatable information although it
is strong private in the sense of [22].
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